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SOME  CURRENT  CONTROVERSIES  IN  THE 
THEORY  OF  INFLATION 
Thomas  M.  Humphrey 
The  theory  of  inflation  is  currently  in  an  un- 
settled  state.  Largely  discredited  by  recent  epi- 
sodes  of  stagflation  in  which  joblessness  and 
prices  rose  simultaneously,  the  once-dominant 
concensus  view  of  a  stable  Phillips  curve  trade 
off  between  unemployment  and  inflation  has 
given  way  to  a  host  of  competing  explanations. 
Today  a  variety  of  issues  relating  to  the  causes, 
transmission,  and  control  of  inflation  are  being 
debated.  A  careful  sorting-out  of  these  issues 
and  a  clarification  of  the  rival  claims  and  dis- 
tinctive  features  of  competing  schools  of  thought 
may  prove  useful. 
The  purpose  of  this  article  is  threefold.  First, 
it  develops  a  general  classificatory  framework 
within  which  particular  issues  can  be  organized 
and  examined.  Second,  it  uses  this  framework  to 
survey  some  of  the  main  debates  that  are  current 
in  contemporary  discussions  of  the  problem  of 
inflation.  Third,  it  identifies  four  distinct  the- 
ories  that  emerge  from  these  debates,  specifies 
their  distinguishing  characteristics,  and  com- 
ments  on  the  plausibility  and  relevance  of  each 
theory. 
The  Four-Equation  Framework  The  basic 
framework  employed  in  this  article  consists  of 
four  relationships  of  the  type  that  appear  in  many 
aggregative  models  of  the  inflationary  process. 
These  relationships  are  derived  from  the  under- 
lying  market  demand  and  supply  equations  that 
constitute  fairly  complete  general  equilibrium 
models  of  the  economy.  The  relationships  include 
(1)  a  wage  equation  explaining  how  the  rate  of 
increase  of  nominal  wages  is  determined  ;  (2)  a 
price  equation  specifyin,  0‘  how  the  rate  of  price 
inflation  is  determined  ;  (3)  a  price-expectations 
equation  explaining  how  people  formulate  their 
expectations  about  the  future  rate  of  inflation; 
and  (4)  a  demand-pressure  equation  that  de- 
scribes  how  the  level  of  excess  aggregate  demand 
-measured  in  terms  of  either  output  (relative  to 
normal  capacity)  or  unemployment-is  deter- 
mined. 
In  its  most  general  form,  the  basic  classifica- 
tory  framework  can  be  written  as  follows. 
1.  WAGE  EQUATION: 
w  =  W[PL,  peL,  XL,  ZLI  * 
2.  PRICE  EQUATION: 
P  =  P[WL,  peL,  XL,  ZLI  * 
3.  PRICE-EXPECTATIONS  EQUATION  : 
p’  =  pe[pL,  ZLI. 
4.  DEMAND-PRESSURE  EQUATION  : 
x  =  x[(m-p>L,  fL,  ZL]. 
Here  w  is  the  percentage  rate  of  change  of  nomi- 
nal  wages;  p  is  the  percentage  rate  of  change  of 
prices,  i.e.,  the  inflation  rate;  pe  is  the  expected 
future  rate  of  change  of  prices,  i.e.,  the  anticipated 
rate  of  inflation;  and  x  is  the  level  of  excess  de- 
mand,  no  distinction  being  made  between  labor 
and  product  markets  .l  The  variables  m  and  m-p 
are  the  percentage  rates  of  change  of  the  nominal 
and  real  (price-deflated)  money  stocks,  respec- 
tively,  and  f  is  the  fiscal  policy  variable  repre- 
sented  by  the  size  of  the  government’s  budgetary 
deficit.  The  variable  z  is  the  vector  of  cost-push 
forces  including  such  factors  as  trade-union  mili- 
tancy,  monopoly  power,  and  the  political  com- 
mitment  to  the  goal  of  full  employment  and  the 
consequent  removal  of  the  fear  of  unemployment 
as  a  factor  constraining  wage  demands.  The  sub- 
script  L  represents  time  lags  denoting  that  the 
dependent  variables  may  be  influenced  by  lagged 
as  well  as  contemporaneous  values  of  the  inde- 
pendent  variables. 
In  the  above  framework,  the  wage  equation 
states  that  the  rate  of  money  wage  increase  is 
determined  by  the  actual  and  anticipated  rates  of 
rise  of  the  cost  of  living,  the  excess  demand  for 
labor,  and  cost-push  forces.  The  price  equation 
‘It  is  not  necessary  to  specify  separate  excess  demand  variables  for 
the  product  and  labor  markets  since  the  two  measures  are  assumed 
to  be  linearly  related.  Excess  demand  in  the  product  market  is 
measured  by  the  gap  between  actual  and  potential  (i.e..  normal  or 
standard)  output.  Excess  demand  in  the  labor  market  is  measured 
by the  difference  between the  actual  and  natural  rates  of  unemploy- 
ment,  where  the  latter  is  the  rate  that,  given  the  inevitable  fric- 
tions,  rigidities,  and  market  imperfections  existing  in  the  economy, 
is  just  consistent  with  demand-suppIy  equiIibrium  in  the  Iabor 
market.  The  linear  relationship  between  the  two  measures  permits 
them  to  be used interchangeably. 
S  ECONOMIC  REVIEW,  JULY/AUGUST  1976 relates  the  rate  at  which  businessmen  increase 
their  product  prices  to  the  rate  of  rise  of  wages, 
to  the  rate  at  which  prices  in  general  are  ex- 
pected  to  rise,  to  excess  demand  in  the  product 
market,  and  to  cost-push  forces.  The  price-expec- 
tations  equation  states  that  the  anticipated  future 
rate  of  inflation  is  generated  from  experienced 
actual  rates  of  price  inflation  and  perhaps  other 
influences  also.  Finally,  the  demand-pressure 
equation  expresses  the  level  of  excess  aggregate 
demand  as  a  function  of  the  rate  of  growth  of  the 
real  stock  of  money,  the  strength  of  fiscal  policy, 
and  the  vector  of  cost-push  forces.  Taken  to- 
gether,  these  relations  form  a  simple  four-equa- 
tion  system  which,  given  the  values  of  the  inde- 
pendent  and  predetermined  (lagged)  variables, 
can  be  solved  for  the  values  of  the  dependent 
variables  w,  p,  pe,  and  x.  These  latter  variables, 
being  determined  within  the  system,  are  said  to 
constitute  the  dependent  or  endogenozts  variables  of 
the  model.  By  contrast,  the  fiscal  policy,  money 
growth,  and  cost-push  variables  are  considered 
exogenous,  i.e.,  determined  outside  the  system. 
The  exogenous  variables  are  treated  as  the 
proximate  causes  or  sources  of  inflation.  They 
correspond  to  three  leading  explanations  of  how 
inflation  gets  started,  namely,  the  fiscalist,  the 
monetarist,  and  the  cost-push  views.  The  first 
two  views  constitute  alternative  versions  of  the 
so-called  demand-pull  theory  of  inflation.  Where- 
as  the  fiscalist  version  concentrates  on  overex- 
pansionary  government  fiscal  policy  as  the  pri- 
mary  source  of  demand  inflation,  the  monetarist 
version  focuses  on  the  causal  role  of  money 
growth,  arguing  that  fiscal  policy  at  best  exerts 
only  a  transitory  impact  on  the  rate  of  inflation. 
Monetarist  theories  also  tend  to  omit  the  cost- 
push  variable  as  a  cause  of  inflation,  although 
they  do  acknowledge  that  cost  increases  are  a 
vital  intermediate  link  in  the  transmission  mech- 
anism  through  which  inflationary  pressures  are 
propagated  through  the  economy.  By  contrast, 
cost-push  theories  stress  the  inflation-initiating- 
as  distinct  from  the  mere  inflation-transmitting- 
role  of  the  cost-push  variable,  asserting  that  it 
enters  the  inflationary  process  both  directly  to 
determine  wage-  and  price-setting  behavior  and 
indirectly  to  influence  the  rate  of  monetary 
growth,  which  is  allowed  to  adjust  passively  so  as 
to  validate  the  cost  inflation  generated  by  unions 
and  firms, 
The  latter  point  raises  the  question  of  the  type 
of  policy  regime  assumed  in  the  general  frame- 
work.  As  formulated  above,  it  assumes  an  exog- 
enous  policy  regime,  i.e.,  one  in  which  the  au- 
thorities  conduct  their  policies  to  insure  that  the 
main  line  of  causation  flows  from  the  policy  vari- 
ables  directly  to  the  dependent  excess  demand 
variable  rather  than  vice  versa.  As  discussed 
later  in  the  article,  however,  the  framework  can 
be  modified  to  accommodate  the  reverse-cau- 
sation  assumption  of  an  endogenous  policy  re- 
gime  in  which  the  authorities  allow  the  policy 
variables  at  least  partially  to  respond  to  and  be 
determined  by  changes  in  excess  demand.  Thus, 
with  suitable  adjustment,  the  model  is  capable  of 
handling  both  types  of  policy  regimes. 
Finally,  it  should  be  noted  that  the  model  con- 
tains  no  equations  representing  the  bond  and/or 
equity  markets.  Thus  it  is  incapable  of  explain- 
ing  the  transmission  of  inflationary  pressures 
through  the  financial  sector  of  the  economy.  In- 
stead,  it  concentrates  on  the  transmission  of  in- 
flation  through  the  money,  labor,  and  product 
markets.  This  shortcoming  notwithstanding,  the 
framework  is  still  sufficiently  general  to  accom- 
modate  important  components  of  many  theories 
of  inflation.  Specific  theories-or  at  least  parts 
of  specific  theories-emerge  from  the  general 
framework  when  one  suppresses  certain  vari- 
ables,  emphasizes  others,  and  perhaps  drops  one 
or  more  of  the  equations.  In  any  case,  the  four 
equations  may  be  taken  as  a  basis  for  outlining 
the  main  controversies  among  current  expositors 
of  the  phenomenon  of  inflation. 
The  Wage  Equation  The  chief  controversy  re- 
lating  to  the  wage  equation  concerns  the  deter- 
minants  of  wage-setting  behavior.  At  least  four 
views  can  be  distinguished,  namely,  (1)  the  naive 
Phillips  curve  hypothesis,  (2)  the  expectations- 
augmented/excess-demand  hypothesis,  (3)  the 
pure  cost-push  hypothesis,  and  (4)  the  eclectic 
view. 
The  Phillips  curve  hypothesis  states  that  the 
rate  of  money  wage  increase  depends  on  the 
excess  demand  for  labor  (i.e.,  w  =  w(x)  where 
x  is  measured  or  proxied  by  the  inverse  of  the 
unemployment  rate).  This  theory  is  incapable  of 
explaining  how  rapid  wage  inflation  could  persist 
in  the  face  of  slack  labor  markets  in  which  excess 
demand  is  zero  or  negative. 
The  expectations  -augmented/excess-demand 
hypothesis  introduces  the  price-expectations  vari- 
able  into  the  Phillips  curve  and  states  that  the 
rate  of  wage  increase  is  determined  by  excess 
demand  in  the  labor  market  and  by  workers’  and 
employers’  anticipations  of  future  price  inflation 
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formulation  is  straightforward.  Demand  pressure 
x  pushes  up  wages.  The  greater  the  pressure  the 
faster  will  wages  rise.  Even  if  demand  pressure 
were  absent  or  negative,  however,  wages  would 
still  exhibit  a  tendency  to  rise  because  workers 
are  primarily  concerned  with  real  wages-i.e., 
with  the  purchasing  power  of  money  wages-and 
therefore  bargain  for  money  wage  increases  suffi- 
cient  to  protect  real  wages  from  anticipated  fu- 
ture  increases  in  the  cost  of  living  (represented  in 
the  equation  by  p’,  or  price  expectations).  Simi- 
larly,  employers  interested  in  maintaining  their 
relative  position  in  the  labor  market  must  offer 
wage  increases  sufficient  to  match  those  increases 
that  rival  employers  are  expected  to  offer.  Other- 
wise  they  will  lose  employees,  and  their  relative 
market  share  will  fall.  Thus  even  in  a  situation 
of  zero  excess  demand,  employers  on  the  average 
will  be  raising  wages  by  the  amount  they  expect 
wages  and  prices  in  general  to  rise.  Nominal 
wages  will  rise,  but  each  employer’s  real  wage 
offer  relative  to  the  market  average  wage  will 
remain  unchanged. 
Opposed  to  the  expectations/excess-demand 
hypothesis  is  the  pure  cost-push  view.  More  in- 
fluential  in  the  United  Kingdom  than  in  the 
United  States,  this  theory  holds  that  the  rate  of 
wage  increase  is  initiated  and  determined  by  the 
vector  of  cost-push  forces  independently  of  price 
expectations  and  the  state  of  excess  demand  (i.e., 
w  =  w(z)).  Cost-push  pressures  include  such 
forces  as  (1)  monopoly  market  power,  (2)  trade- 
union  militancy,  and  (3)  wage  earners’  frustra- 
tion  arising  from  unfulfilled  expectations  regard- 
ing  growth  of  real  income  and  relative  income 
shares.  Labor  unrest,  frustration,  and  militancy 
are  seen  as  causes  and  not-as  in  the  monetarist 
theory-as  consequences  of  inflation. 
The  cost-push  hypothesis  is  in  the  class  of  the- 
ories  that  attribute  inflation  to  monopoly  power, 
whether  wielded  by  unions  or  corporations.  These 
theories  assert  that  large  organizations,  seeking 
to  enlarge  their  relative  shares  in  the  national  in- 
come,  utilize  the  market  power  in  their  possession 
to  push  wages  and  prices  upward,  thus  spear- 
heading  and  causing  new  rounds  of  inflation. 
The  monopoly  power  hypothesis  has  been  criti- 
cized  predominantly,  but  not  solely,  by  mone- 
tarists  on  both  theoretical  and  empirical  grounds. 
First,  critics  state  that  the  market  power  argu- 
ment  is  at  odds  with  the  orthodox  theory  of  mo- 
nopoly  behavior.  According  to  the  orthodox 
view,  a  monopolist  sets  a  relative  price  for  his 
product  that  maximizes  profits  in  real  terms  and 
maintains  that  real  price  by  adjusting  his  nominal 
price  to  allow  for  inflation.  The  logical  implica- 
tion  is  that,  given  the  degree  of  monopoly  power, 
monopolists  would  have  no  incentive  to  raise 
prices  other  than  to  catch  up  or  keep  pace  with 
general  inflation.  2  With  real  prices  already  estab- 
lished  at  profit  maximizing  levels,  any  further 
upward  adjustment  would  only  reduce  profits.  On 
the  other  hand,  if  prices  are  currently  being  raised 
to  exploit  hitherto  unexploited  monopoly  poten- 
tial,  the  question  naturally  arises  as  to  why  those 
gains  were  foregone  or  sacrificed  in  the  past.  In 
either  case,  monetarists  argue,  rising  real  prices 
imply  non-rational  (i.e.,  non-profit  maximizing) 
behavior,  contrary  to  the  basic  axiom  of  conven-, 
tional  economic  theory.  True,  rising  real  prices’ 
would  be  consistent  with  profit  maximizing  behavior 
if  the  degree  of  monopoly  power  were  increasing.” 
But  there  is  little  empirical  evidence  that  mo- 
nopoly  power  is  on  the  rise. 
Responding  to  this  criticism,  cost-push  theo- 
rists  state  that  the  monopoly  power  of  labor  i.c 
rising,  as  evidenced  by  the  spread  of  unionization 
to  groups  not  previously  organized,  e.g.,  public 
(government)  employees.  Also  cited  are  factors 
such  as  liberal  unemployment  benefits  and  wel- 
fare  payments  that  have  raised  workers’  capacity 
to  hold  out  in  long  strikes.  With  regard  to  the 
question  of  rational  maximizing  behavior,  some 
cost-push  advocates  maintain  that  the  conven 
tional  analysis  cannot  be  applied  to  unions  be,- 
cause  the  latter,  unlike  the  business  firms  of  tra- 
ditional  theory,  do  not  necessarily  maximize  in- 
come. 
To  the  critics,  however,  this  last  point  is  totally 
irrelevant.  Trade  unions,  they  argue,  do  not  have 
to  be  income  maximizers  for  the  conventional 
2 1x1 support  of  this  contention,  critics  of  cost-push  cite  empirical 
studies  showing  that  when  big  firms  do  raise  their  prices  they  are 
usually  trying  to  catch  up  with  general  inflation.  Such  catch-up 
price  increases  should  not  be  interpreted  as  inflation-generating 
price  increases..  Similarly,  when  unions  raise  wages,  they  are 
often  just  trying  to  catch  up  with  past  price  increases  or  protect 
wages  from  expected  future  price  increases.  They  are  not  neces- 
sarily  trying  to  increase  their  relative  income  share,  which  is  prob- 
ably  already  at  its  maximum.  given  the  degree  of  their  market 
POWfZ. 
3 The point  here is that  the mere  existence  of  monopoly  power  is not 
enough  to  produce  inflation.  The  monopoly  power  must  be  steadily 
increasing.  Monopoly  power  results  in  resource  misallocation,  thus 
reducing  real  income  and  raising  the  price  level  relative  to  what  it 
would be if  perfect  competition  prevailed.  But  this  is  an  argument 
for  high,  not  rising,  prices.  To  produce  inflation,  i.e.,  a  condition 
of  continually rising  prices,  monopoly  power  must  be ever-increasing. 
An  existing  degree  of  monopoly  power  cannot  venerate  a  sustained 
inflation. 
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leaders  attempt  to  maximize  sowe  variable-e.g., 
union  membership,  hourly  wage  rates,  or  the 
wage  bill  of  a  select  portion  of  the  union  member- 
ship.  That  is,  it  still  holds  as  long  as  union  be- 
havior  results  in  a  determinate  equilibrium  real 
wage.  What  is  relevant,  the  critics  assert,  is  the 
distinction  between  relative  prices  and  absolute 
prices,  i.e.,  the  general  price  level.  Cost-push 
theory  is  alleged  to  display  a  fundamental  con- 
fusion  involving  the  use  of  relative  price  concepts 
to  explain  the  behavior  of  the  absolute  price  level. 
According  to  the  critics  of  cost-push,  market 
power  is  not  a  legitimate  explanation  of  general 
inflation.  Monopoly  power  determines  relative 
prices,  not  the  general  price  level  or  its  rate  of 
change.  To  be  sure,  the  particular  price  of  a  mo- 
nopolized  product  will  be  higher  relative  to  other 
prices  than  it  would  be  if  the  specific  industry 
were  competitive.  But  except  for  a  slight  rise 
due  to  resource  misallocation,  the  overall  or  gen- 
eral  level  of  prices  would  probably  remain  sub- 
stantially  unchanged.  Likewise  specific  wage 
rates  obtained  by  monopolistic  unions  will  be 
higher  in  comparison  with  other  wages  than 
would  be  the  case  if  all  labor  markets  were  com- 
petitive.  Again,  however,  the  overall  level  of 
wages  need  not  be  affected.  In  both  cases,  mo- 
nopoly  power  affects  the  structure  of  wages  and 
prices  but  not  their  general  level.  The  logic  behind 
this  conclusion  is  straightforward  and  goes  as 
follows.  When  a  monopolist  raises  his  price  he 
reduces  his  output  and  his  employment  of  factor 
inputs,  thereby  releasing  resources  to  increase 
output  and  lower  prices  elsewhere  in  the  econ- 
omy.  Similarly,  when  a  monopolistic  labor  union 
raises  its  wage,  it  causes  a  diminution  of  employ- 
ment  in  its  sector,  thereby  releasing  labor  to 
other  sectors  where  the  increased  labor  supply 
acts  to  lower  wage  rates.  In  either  case,  the  rise 
in  monopoly  prices  (or  wages)  is  offset  by  a 
compensating  reduction  in  competitive  prices  (or 
wages),  leaving  the  average  level  unchanged. 
Monopoly  power  determines  relative  prices  (and 
hence  quantities  sold  or  employed),  not  absolute 
prices  as  claimed  by  the  cost-push  hypothesis. 
Cost-push  theorists  rebut  this  latter  criticism  by 
challenging  the  validity  of  its  underlying  assump- 
tions  of  perfect  resource  mobility  and  perfect 
price  flexibility.  They  correctly  point  out  that  if 
resources  are  relatively  immobile  and  prices 
downwardly  inflexible,  particular  price  increases 
can  cause  generalized  inflation,  i.e.,  in  this  case 
absolute  prices  are  not  independent  of  relative 
prices.  In  a  world  of  sticky  prices,  inflation  could 
occur  for  two  reasons.  First,  the  general  price 
index,  constituting  an  average  of  all  prices,  will 
necessarily  rise  purely  as  a  matter  of  arithmetic 
when  a  rise  in  one  of  its  components  is  not  offset 
by  a  fall  in  the  others.  Second  and  more  im- 
portant,  rising  relative  prices  may  induce  addi- 
tional  inflation  via  the  policymakers’  reaction  to 
their  impact  on  employment.  With  a  constant 
level  of  aggregate  expenditure  and  downwardly 
rigid  prices,  particular  price  increases  will  gener- 
ate  compensating  reductions  not  in  other  prices 
but  rather  in  output  and  employment.  Given 
society’s  high  employment  objectives,  the  au- 
thorities  may  have  no  choice  but  to  accommodate 
the  specific  price  increases  with  expansionary 
policies  when  employment  falls  below  its  target 
level.  Thus  the  political  constraints  imposed  by 
the  commitment  to  high  employment  may  enter 
directly  into  the  process  by  which  particular  cost 
increases  are  transformed  into  generalized  infla- 
tionary  pressures. 
In  some  quarters  this  explanation  has  been  dis- 
missed  on  grounds  that  it  has  been  falsified  by 
experience,  which  shows  that  high  levels  of  un- 
employment,  while  much  deplored,  have  never- 
theless  been  tolerated  for  long  periods.  But  many 
analysts  accept  the  explanation  as  valid,  and  the 
debate  between  the  cost-push  theorists  and  their 
critics  continues.  There  is,  however,  an  eclectic 
view  of  wage-setting  behavior  that  lies  between 
the  extremes  of  the  pure  cost-push  and  excess- 
demand  views  and  incorporates  elements  of  both. 
According  to  this  third  view,  wages  are  pulled 
up  by  excess  demand,  pushed  up  by  cost-push 
forces,  and  rise  in  response  to  increases  in  the 
cost  of  living,  actual  and  anticipated.  In  equation 
form  this  eclectic  view  can  be  expressed  as  w  = 
w(p,  p”, x,  z>. 
The  Price  Equation  Regarding  the  price  equa- 
tion,  four  issues  have  dominated  recent  discus- 
sion.  The  first  concerns  the  proper  specification 
of  the  independent  variables  in  the  equation. 
What  are  the  dominant  determinants  of  price- 
setting  behavior?  There  is  unanimous  agreement 
that  the  rate  of  wage  inflation  affects  the  rate  of 
price  increase.  But  there  is  much  less  agreement 
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in  price  determination.  Both  the  Phillips  curve 
and  expectations-augmented/excess-demand  the- 
ories  contend  that  it  does,  while  the  cost-push 
hypothesis  claims  it  does  not. 
This  latter  point,  incidentally,  explains  why 
cost-push  theorists  advocate  incomes  policies  and 
direct  controls  as  anti-inflation  weapons.  For  if 
the  rate  of  inflation  is  determined  not  by  excess 
demand  but  rather  by  cost-push  forces  operating 
through  wages  and  profit  markups,  then  it  fol- 
lows  that  inflation  will  be  immune  to  traditional 
restrictive  demand-management  policies.  In  such 
cases  it  may  be  necessary  to  employ  incomes  poli- 
cies  to  influence  the  underlying  cost-push  forces 
and  to  use  controls  to  directly  constrain  rates  of 
wage  and  price  increase. 
Aside  from  the  cost-push  view,  the  other  main 
theory  of  price-setting  behavior  that  denies  ex- 
cess  demand  a  direct  price-determining  role  is 
the  so-called  normal-cost  hypothesis.  This  theory 
states  that  prices  are  determined  by  applying 
fixed  percentage  markups  to  unit  production 
costs  at  normal  (standard)  levels  of  capacity 
utilization,  with  the  markups  set  to  yield  target 
.rates  of  return  on  equity.  This  hypothesis  focuses 
on  the  rate  of  wage  increase  that  constitutes  the 
dominant  component  of  changes  in  unit  costs 
upon  which  price  changes  depend.  Note,  how- 
ever,  that  the  normal-cost  hypothesis  is  not  in- 
compatible  with  the  notion  that  prices  respond, 
with  a  lag,  to  excess  demand,  since  that  variable 
can  influence  prices  indirectly  through  the  labor 
markets.  The  price  equation  in  this  case  can  be 
expressed  either  as  p  =  p(w)  or  p  =  p(xt) 
where  the  time-lag  L  represents  the  time  it  takes 
for  demand  pressure  to  influence  product  prices 
through  the  channel  of  factor  costs. 
The  second  issue  is  whether  a  long-run  infla- 
tion-output  (or  inflation-unemployment)  trade 
off  exists,  thereby  permitting  the  authorities  to 
peg  the  unemployment  rate  at  any  desired  Ieve 
without  risking  persistent  acceleration  of  the  rate 
of  inflation.  The  standard  Phillips  curve  hy- 
pothesis  implied  the  affirmative.  But  the  notion 
of  a  permanent  trade  off  was  severely  challenged 
by  the  so-called  accelerationist  school.  Using  an 
expectations-augmented/excess-demand  version 
of  the  Phillips  curve  price  equation,  this  school 
demonstrated  that  the  trade  off  is  only  temporary, 
that  it  depends  upon  people  being  fooled  by  un- 
anticipated  inflation  (i.e.,  the  difference  between 
actual  and  expected  inflation  p  -  p’),  and  that  it 
vanishes  in  the  long  run  when  price  expectations 
fully  adjust  to  price  experience  and  are  com- 
pletely  incorporated  in  wage-  and  price-setting 
behavior.  Accelerationists  argued  that  inflation 
stimulates  economic  activity  only  if  it  is  unantici- 
pated.  An  unexpected  inflation  induces  produc- 
ers,  who  are  pleasantly  surprised  to  find  their 
product  prices  rising  faster  and  their  real  (price- 
deflated)  costs  rising  slower  than  expected,  to 
expand  output  and  employment.  But  the  stimu- 
lative  effects  eventually  disappear  when  the  infla- 
tion  becomes  fully  anticipated.  This  conclusion 
can  be  expressed  symbolically  by  rearranging 
the  accelerationist  price  equation  p  =  ax  +  pe to 
read  p  -  p’  =  ax,  where  the  coefficient  a  ex- 
presses  the  numerical  magnitude  of  the  trade  off 
between  the  variables  on  the  left-  and  right-hand 
sides  of  the  equation.  So  written,  the  equation 
states  that  the  trade  off  is  between  unanticipated 
inflation  p  -  p’  and  output  (as  represented  by 
real  excess  demand  x)  and  that  it  vanishes  when 
inflation  is  fully  anticipated  and  adjusted  for,  i.e., 
when  p  -  p” =  zero.s 
A  separate  but  closely  related  issue  is  whether 
even  an  indefinitely  accelerating  inflation  is  suffi- 
cient  to  provide  a  permanent  stimulus  to  real 
activity.  Some  accelerationist  models  that  deny 
the  existence  of  a  long-run  trade  off  between 
output  and  the  rate  of  inflation  itself  nevertheless 
imply  that,  if  price  expectations  are  formed  in  a 
certain  way,  there  will  be  a  stable  trade  off  be- 
tween  output  and  the  rate  of  acceleration  of  the 
inflation  rate  (Ap).  In  other  words,  while 
expectations  would  eventually  adapt  completely 
to  any  stable  rate  of  inflation,  thereby  negating 
the  trade  off,  those  expectations  would  consis- 
tently  lag  behind  a  constantly  accelerating  rate.  A 
policy  of  inflatin  g  the  price  level  at  a  faster  and 
faster  pace  can  thus  permanently  fool  all  the 
people  all  the  time  and  peg  the  economy  at  any 
’ The  no-trade-off  view  implies  that  the  price-expectations  variable 
enters the  price equation with a  coefficient  of  unity.  To  show this  let 
the price  equation be p =  ax +  +p’  where +  is the coefficient  attached 
to P’.  Long-run equilibrium is characterized  by equality between actual 
and  anticipated  rates  of  inflation,  reflecting  the  tendency  of  price 
expectations to be correctly formed  in the  long run.  Setting p’  =  p in 
the  equation  as  required  for  long-run  equilibrium  and  solving  for  p 
yields the expression p =  [a/  (I-  a) lx. If the coefficient  +  is a fraction, 
adjustment  to  fully-anticipated  inflation  is  incomplete,  and  a  stable 
long-run trade  off  exists between  p and  x.  But  if  the  coefficient  Cp  is 
unity,  implying  complete  adjustment  to  anticipated  inflation,  the 
bracketed term is undefined and the trade  off  vanishes. 
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other  economists  have  pointed  out,  however,  it  is 
unlikely  that  such  a  policy  could  fool  the  people 
forever.  Eventually  they  would  anticipate  the  rate 
of  acceleration  itself  and  adapt  to  it.  The  policy- 
makers  would  then  have  to  go  to  still  higher  de- 
rivatives  or  orders  of  rates  of  price  change  (A2p, 
A3p, . .  . A”p)  to  stimulate  the  economy,  and  these 
higher  derivatives,  too,  wouId  eventually  come  to 
be  anticipated. 
It  should  be  stressed,  however,  that  many  ana- 
lysts  remain  skeptical  of  arguments  denying  the 
existence  of  permanent  trade  offs  involving  in- 
flation  and  its  derivatives.  These  skeptics  point 
to  the  stringent  assumptions  underlying  the  no- 
trade-off  view.  Not  only  must  price  expectations 
be  correct  and  unanimously  held,  but  those  an- 
ticipations  must  be  completely  incorporated  in  all 
contracts  to  preserve  the  equilibrium  structure 
of  relative  prices  and  real  incomes.  Skeptics 
argue  that  even  if  the  first  condition  were  satis- 
fied-a  heroic  assumption-the  second  probably 
would  be  violated.  For  one  thing,  certain  passive 
income  groups-e.g.,  rentiers  and  pensioners- 
may  be  powerless  to  act  on  their  price  forecasts. 
Other  groups  that  possess  the  power  to  adjust 
their  nominal  incomes  for  fully  anticipated  infla- 
tion  may  choose  not  to  do  so.  An  example  would 
be  where  workers  are  more  concerned  about  their 
relative  (comparative)  wages  vis-a-vis  each  other 
than  about  the  absolute  level  of  real  wages.  These 
workers  would  be  willing  to  accept  inflation-in- 
duced  reductions  in  real  wages  as  long  as  other 
wages  were  similarly  affected  and  relative  wage 
relationships  remained  unaltered.  Whether  such 
hypothetical  situations  of  incomplete  adjustment 
under  conditions  of  rational  behavior  do  in  fact 
actually  occur,  however,  is  an  open  question,  and 
the  controversy  over  the  existence  of  long-run 
trade  offs  remains  unresolved. 
A  fourth  issue  is  concerned  with  the  causes  of 
price  rigidity  or,  more  precisely,  with  explaining 
why  prices  tend  to  respond  so  slowly  to  shifts  in 
demand.  Interest  in  this  topic  has  been  greatly 
a An  example  will demonstrate.  Let the price equation be p =  ax +  pe 
where the unit coefficient attached to p’  implies the  absence of  a long- 
run trade  off  between p  and x.  From this equation it follows  that  the 
relationship among the rates of  change  of  the variables  p,  x,  and p* is 
given by the  expression p  =  ax  +  9  where the  dots  indmate rates  of 
change  (time  derivatives)  of  the  variables.  Now  assume that  people 
are  continuously revising their  price  expectations  by  some  fraction  b 
of the forecasting  error between actual and predicted rates of inflation 
P  -  P’.  This  expectations-generating  mechanism  is  written  as  6’  = 
b(p-p’)  where  9  is the rate  of  change of  price expectations.  Substi- 
tuting this latter  equation into the  one immediately  preceding  it  and 
simplifying  yields  i,  =  a?  +  abx.  Finally,  if  excess  demand  is  un- 
changing so that % =  zero-as  would be the case if the authorities were 
pegging x at some desired level  -this  last equation reduces to fi =  abx, 
showing a trade-off  relation between the rate  of  change  of  the rate  of 
inflation P and  excess demand  x. 
stimulated  by  the  recent  experience  with  infla- 
tionary  recession  or  stagflation  in  which  prices 
continued  to  rise  long  after  excess  demand  had 
disappeared. 
The  traditional  or  classical  model  of  price  dy- 
namics  is  of  no  help  in  explaining  why  inflation 
persists  despite  slack  markets  and  high  unem- 
ployment.  According  to  the  traditional  model, 
prices  adjust  swiftly  in  response  to  excess  de- 
mand  or  supply  so  as  to  clear  the  market.  Nor  is 
the  Phillips  curve  model  that  expresses  the  rate 
of  price  change  as  a  function  of  excess  demand 
useful  in  interpreting  stagflation.  This  model 
predicts  that  the  rate  of  price  change  is  zero  when 
excess  demand  is  eliminated  and  that  price  deflation 
accompanies  excess  supply.  Neither  model  is 
consistent  with  experience  showing  that  positive 
rates  of  price  change  can  coexist  with  zero  or 
negative  excess  demand  for  protracted  periods  of 
time.  Apparently,  many  markets  lack  the  short- 
run  excess-demand  price-adjustment  mechanisms 
postulated  by  the  classical  and  Phillips  curve  the- 
ories.  What  accounts  for  the  actual  slow-working 
price  mechanism  and  for  the  consequent  persis- 
tence  of  inflation  even  in  the  face  of  slack  demand 
and  high  unemployment?  At  least  three  expla- 
nations  have  been  offered. 
In  the  expectations-augmented/excess-demand 
model,  prices  can  continue  to  rise  even  when 
excess  demand  is  zero  or  negative  as  long  as 
inflationary  expectations  are  sufficiently  strong. 
Stagflation  is  explained  in  terms  of  sticky  price 
anticipations.  Specifically,  the  model  states  that 
price  expectations  are  based  on  past  price  experi- 
ence.  And  if  that  experience  has  been  one  of 
inflation,  price  anticipations  can  continue  to 
mount,  putting  upward  pressure  on  prices  even 
when  aggregate  demand  is  falling.  With  price 
anticipations  still  adapting  to  the  inflationary 
past,  the  response  of  actual  inflation  to  a  reduc- 
tion  in  aggregate  demand  will  be  agonizingly 
slow. 
A  second  explanation  attributes  sluggish  price 
adjustment  to  the  prevalence  of  long-term  con- 
tractual  arrangements  that  fix  prices  for  substan- 
tial  intervals  of  time.  Such  contractual  rigidities 
are  said  to  distinguish  so-called  customer  markets 
from  spot-auction  markets  where  flexible  prices 
operate  to  keep  the  market  continuously  cleared. 
In  customer  markets,  high  search  costs  (time, 
effort,  inconvenience,  etc.)  of  comparison  shop- 
ping  give  buyers  an  incentive  to  continue  trading 
with  customary  sellers  whose  offers  have  proven 
satisfactory  in  the  past.  The  customers  of  course 
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must  believe  that  the  terms  of  the  offers  will  re- 
main  unchanged,  otherwise  it  might  pay  them  to 
desert  regular  suppliers  and  shop  elsewhere.  The 
sellers  themselves  have  an  incentive  to  maintain 
stable  prices  in  order  to  retain  their  established 
clientele.  Since  higher  prices  would  encourage 
customers  to  shop  elsewhere,  sellers  avoid  or  de- 
lay  changing  p rices  in  response  to  short-run 
shifts  in  demand. 
In  effect,  sellers  implicitly  agree  to  maintain 
their  price  offers  in  return  for  buyers’  implicit 
promises  of  continued  patronage.  The  agreement 
remains  implicit  because  of  the  high  legal  costs 
of  negotiating  and  spelling  out  an  explicit  formal 
written  contract.  Like  all  unwritten  agreements, 
however,  these  implicit  contracts  only  work  if 
both  parties  assent  to  certain  rules  of  fair  play. 
In  the  case  of  customer  markets  the  typical  stan- 
dard  of  fair  play  involves  setting  prices  on  the 
basis  of  long-run  unit  costs.  Buyers  are  willing 
to  accept  price  increases  induced  by  permanent 
shifts  in  unit  costs.  Sellers  in  turn  agree 
to  absorb  temporary  cost  increases  just  as  they 
agree  to  ignore  short-run  shifts  in  demand  when 
setting  their  prices.  Thus  prices  remain  unre- 
sponsive  to  short-run  shifts  in  demand  and  costs. 
A  third  explanation  of  sluggish  price  adjust- 
ment  stresses  producer  interdependence  and  the 
need  for  price  coordination.  This  view  states 
that  in  many  industries  there  is  much  uncertainty 
concerning  the  market-clearing  price.  Given  this 
uncertainty,  firms  endeavor  to  avoid  the  market 
disruption,  confusion,  and  perhaps  even  outright 
price  warfare  that  could  result  if  each  sought 
individually  to  determine  the  equilibrium  price. 
In  order  to  prevent  such  confusion  from  develop- 
ing,  firms  seek  ways  to  coordinate  price  changes. 
Such  coordination,  if  successful,  will  assure  that 
firms  raise  prices  in  unison  and  that  price  changes 
will  not  occur  when  demand  shifts  are  thought  to 
be  temporary  and  reversible.  The  preferred 
method  of  facilitating  coordination  is  to  base 
price  changes  on  changes  in  standard  unit  labor 
and  material  costs,  which  tend  to  be  the  same  for 
all  firms  in  the  industry.  This  cost-based  pricing 
behavior  assures  that  prices  will  respond  only  to 
costs,  not  to  demand-although  demand  pressure 
may  of  course  affect  prices  indirectly  through  the 
factor  markets.  It  also  assures  that  price  changes 
will  be  uniform  throughout  the  industry  thereby 
minimizing  the  risk  of  competitive  price  under- 
cutting. 
The  Price-Expectations  Equation  The  preceding 
sections  have  concentrated  on  alternative  views 
of  wage-  and  price-setting  behavior.  As  previ- 
ously  noted,  many  of  these  explanations  stress 
the  role  of  expectations  of  future  price  inflation  as 
a  key  determinant  of  rates  of  actual  wage  and 
price  increase.  In  view  of  the  central  importance 
attached  to  price  expectations,  it  is  not  surprising 
that  much  recent  attention  has  focused  on  the 
mechanism  by  which  those  expectations  are  gen- 
erated  and  revised.  Concerning  the  formation  of 
expectations,  at  least  three  hypotheses.  have 
emerged. 
The  first  sees  price  expectations  as  determined 
by  essentially  unexplainable  psychological  forces. 
This  view  interprets  the  anticipated  rate  of  infla- 
tion  as  a  volatile,  unstable  variable  subject  to 
sudden  and  frequent  shifts  due  to  changes  in  sub- 
jective  non-economic  factors  that  cannot  be  sys- 
tematically  explained  within  the  framework  of  a 
macroeconomic  model. 
The  second  hypothesis,  in  sharp  contrast  with 
the  first,  states  that  price  expectations  are  sys- 
tematically  determined  by  objective  economic 
data,  namely,  actual  rates  of  inflation  experienced 
in  the  past.  Known  as  the  adaptive-expectations  or 
error-learning  hypothesis,  this  theory  postulates  that 
individuals  form  expectations  of  future  rates  of 
inflation  from  a  geometrically  weighted  average 
of  experienced  past  rates  of  inflation  and  then 
periodically  revise  those  expectations  if  actual 
inflation  turns  out  to  be  different  than  expected. 
In  econometric  studies  of  the  inflationary  process 
the  adaptive-expectations  model  constitutes  the 
most  prevalent  explanation  of  how  price  expecta- 
tions  are  generated. 
Despite  its  widespread  use,  many  economists 
are  dissatisfied  with  the  adaptive-expectations 
hypothesis.  They  think  it  is  an  unrealistic  and 
inaccurate  description  of  how  price  anticipations 
are  formed.  Expectations,  they  claim,  are  as 
likely  to  be  generated  from  direct  forecasts  of  the 
future  as  from  mere  projections  of  the  past.  More- 
over,  people  probably  base  their  anticipations  at 
least  as  much  on  current  information  about  a 
variety  of  developments  -  e.g.,  money  stock 
growth  rates,  imminent  changes  in  political  ad- 
ministration-as  on  data  pertaining  solely  to  past 
price  changes.  In  short,  one  would  expect  ra- 
tional  individuals  to  utilize  all  the  relevant  informa- 
tion  to  improve  the  accuracy  of  their  price  fore- 
casts.  Yet  the  adaptive-expectations  hypothesis 
holds  that  people  look  at  only  a  small  subset  of 
the  relevant  information-namely,  past  price changes--’  m  forming  expectations.  This  does  not 
appear  to  be  consistent  with  rational  forecasting 
behavior. 
Disenchantment  with  the  adaptive-expectations 
model  has  stimulated  a  search  for  an  alternative 
explanation  of  the  expectations-generating  mech- 
anism.  This  search  has  culminated  in  the  formu- 
lation  of  the  so-called  rational-expectations  hypothe- 
sis,  which  constitutes  the  third  view  of  expectations 
formation  as  mentioned  above. 
According  to  the  rational-expectations  hypoth- 
esis,  individuals  will  tend  to  exploit  a21 the  pertinent 
information  about  the  inflationary  process  when 
making  their  price  forecasts.  If  true,  this  means 
that  forecasting  errors  ultimately  could  arise 
only  from  random  (unforeseen)  shocks  occurring 
to  the  economy.  At  first,  of  course,  forecast- 
ing  errors  could  also  arise  because  individuals 
initially  possess  limited  or  incomplete  informa- 
tion  about  the  inflationary  mechanism.  But  it  is 
unlikely  that  this  latter  condition  would  persist. 
For  if  the  public  is  truly  rational,  it  will  quickly 
learn  from  these  inflationary  surprises  and  in- 
corporate  the  new  information  into  its  forecast- 
ing  procedures,  i.e.,  the  sources  of  forecasting 
mistakes  will  be  swiftly  perceived  and  systemat- 
ically  eradicated.  As  knowledge  of  the  inflation- 
ary  process  improves,  forecasting  models  will  be 
continually  revised  to  produce  more  accurate  pre- 
dictions.  Eventually  all  systematic  (predictable) 
elements  influencing  the  rate  of  inflation  will  be- 
come  known  and  fully  understood,  and  individ- 
uals’  price  expectations  will  constitute  the  most 
accurate  (unbiased)  forecast  consistent  with  that 
knowledge.6  As  incorporated  in  monetarist 
models,  the  rational-expectations  hypothesis  im- 
plies  that  thereafter,  except  for  unavoidable  sur- 
prises  due  to  purely  random  shocks,  price  expec- 
tations  will  always  be  correct  and  the  economy 
will  always  be  at  its  long-run  steady-state  equili- 
brium.7 
6 Specifically,  the rational expectations hypothesis states that  when ex- 
pectations  are  formed  rationally,  the  anticipated  rate  of  inflation 
formed  at the end of the preceding period p’-% is an unbiased predictor 
of the actual rate of  inflation p, given all the information I-,  available 
at the  end of  the  preceding  period.  That  is! the  expected  value  of p. 
given the  information I-,,  is p”-].  In equation form,  p’-r  =  E(plI-,) 
where E  is the  expectations operator.  This  latter formulation  implies 
that the actual rate of  inflation can differ  from  the expected  rate  only 
by a random forecasting  error e, i.e.,  ~--p’-~  =  p-E(plL1)  =  P.  The 
forecasting  error E is of  course statistically independent of  all informa- 
tion known  as  of  the  end of  the  preceding period,  since all  statistical 
correlations between l  and I already would have been incorporated into 
the  latter  variable. 
7 In  deterministic  non-stochastic  models  of  the  type  employed  in 
this  article,  random  shocks  are  ruled  out.  Therefore.  in  terms  of 
the  model,  the  rational-expectations  hypothesis  implies  that  the 
economy  is  perpetually  in  steady-state  equilibrium. 
Monetarist  advocates  of  the  strict  rational- 
expectations  view  argue  that  it  carries  some  rad- 
ical  implications  for  stabilization  policy.  Specif- 
ically  it  implies  that  systematic  policy  actions- 
e.g.,  those  based  on  feedback  control  rules-can- 
not  influence  real  variables  even  in  the  short  run, 
since  rational  agents  would  already  have  antici- 
pated  and  acted  upon  those  policies.  To  have  an 
impact  on  output  and  employment  the  authorities 
must  be  able  to  create  a  divergence  between 
actual  and  expected  inflation.  This  follows  from 
the  monetarist  view  that  inflation  influences  real 
variables  only  when  it  is  unanticipated.  The  au- 
thorities  must  be  able  to  alter  the  actual  rate  of 
inflation  without  simultaneously  causing  an  iden- 
tical  change  in  the  expected  future  rate.  This 
may  be  impossible  if  the  public  can  predict  policy 
actions.  Systematic  policy  actions  are  of  course 
predictable  policy  actions.  Stable  policy  response 
functions  can  be  estimated  and  incorporated  into 
the  information  used  by  forecasters.  Rational 
agents,  that  is,  can  use  past  observations  on  the 
behavior  of  the  authorities  to  predict  future 
policy  moves.  Then,  on  the  basis  of  these  predic- 
tions,  agents  can  correct  for  the  policies  before- 
hand  by  makin  g  appropriate  adjustments  to  all 
nominal  wages  and  prices.  Consequently,  when 
stabilization  actions  do  occur,  they  will  have  no 
impact  on  real  variables  since  they  will  have  been 
discounted  and  neutralized  in  advance.  The  only 
conceivable  way  that  policy  can  have  even  a 
short-run  influence  on  real  variables  is  for  it  to 
be  completely  unexpected,  i.e.,  the  policymakers 
must  act  in  an  unpredictable  random  fashion.  But 
random  behavior  hardly  seems  a  proper  basis  for 
public  policy. 
Monetarist  proponents  of  rational  expectations 
use  reasoning  similar  to  the  above  to  deny  the 
effectiveness  of  discretionary  stabilization  policy. 
But  advocates  of  countercyclical  discretionary 
policy  argue  that  such  extreme  conclusions  are 
unwarranted.  They  point  out  that  the  strict  ra- 
tional-expectations  hypothesis,  despite  its  seem- 
ingly  powerful  logic,  does  not  stand  up  well 
against  the  facts.  According  to  this  group,  policy 
actions  have  pronounced  and  protracted  short- 
run  effects  on  real  variables,  the  economy  is 
rarely  at  or  even  near  its  long-run  steady-state 
equilibrium  path,  forecasting  remains  an  ex- 
tremely  hazardous  and  surprise-ridden  business, 
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restrictive  policy.  Something  must  be  wrong 
with  the  strict  rational-expectations  view. 
To  critics,  this  view  suffers  from  two  main 
flaws.  First,  in  common  with  all  monetarist 
models,  the  rational-expectations  hypothesis  im- 
plies  that  transitory  output  effects  can  only  arise 
from  expectational  errors,  i.e.,  discrepancies  be- 
tween  actual  and  expected  rates  of  price  change. 
In  a  rational  non-stochastic  world  such  errors 
never  occur  since  expectations  are  always  correct. 
Second,  the  rational-expectations  hypothesis  im- 
plies  perfect  price  flexibility.  This  follows  from 
the  view  that  actual  prices  never  deviate  from 
expected  prices,  i.e.,  the  current  rate  of  inflation 
always  adjusts  completely  and  instantaneously  to 
changes  in  the  expected  rate,  so  that  steady-state 
equilibrium  always  prevails. 
Both  implications,  critics  hold,  strain  credulity. 
Far  from  being  perfectly  flexible,  prices  are  actu- 
ally  sticky  and  respond  slowly-as  indicated  by 
the  persistence  of  stubborn  inflation.  Moreover, 
the  lone  b  price-adjustment  lags  and  the  corre- 
sponding  protracted  output  and  employment 
effects  observed  in  practice  cannot  be  explained 
solely  in  terms  of  expectational  surprises.  Price 
setters  just  do  not  take  that  long  to  react  to 
purely  expectational  errors.  Long  price  delays 
and  the  associated  quantity  effects  can  only  arise 
from  contractual  and  institutional  rigidities  that 
prevent  economic  agents  from  adjusting  to  in- 
flation  even  when  it  is  correctly  anticipated. 
Critics  argue  that  once  such  contractual  rigidities 
are  taken  into  account,  the  strict  version  of  the 
rational-expectations  hypothesis  ceases  to  hold. 
Instead,  the  forecasting  procedure  best  suited  to 
such  cases  may  well  be  one  that  approximates  the 
adaptive-expectations  model.8 
The  Demand-Pressure  Equation  The  demand- 
pressure  equation  completes  the  model  of  the  in- 
flationary  process.  It  does  so  by  specifying  the 
proximate  determinants  of  the  excess  demand 
variable  that  interacts  with  other  variables  in  the 
*The  strict  rational-expectations  hypothesis  departs  from  reality  in 
still  another  way.  It  assumes  that  all  relevant  information  is freely 
available  so  that  forecasting  accuracy  can  be  perfected  at  zero 
marginal  cost.  In  actuality.  however,  the  cost  of  acquiring  and 
processing  additional  information  may  be  quite  high  relative  to 
benefits-think  of  the  cost  of  computer  time.  Confronted  with  high 
information  costs,  economically  rational  agents  might  well  forego 
the  pure  rational-expectations  approach  in  favor  of  cruder  but  less 
costly  forecasting  techniques.  e.g.,  the  adaptive-expectations  model. 
wage  and  price  equations  to  determine  the  rate 
of  inflation.  Debates  pertaining  to  the  demand- 
pressure  equation  center  on  two  issues. 
The  first  issue  involves  the  question  of  the 
relative  importance  of  the  three  main  independent 
variables  in  the  equation  : the  rate  of  money  stock 
growth,  fiscal  policy,  and  cost-push  forces.  Of 
these  three  variables,  which  exercises  the  major 
influence  on  demand  pressure?  Not  surprisingly, 
the  answer  often  depends  upon  whether  the  ana- 
lyst  is  a  nonmonetarist,  a  monetarist,  or  an  advo- 
cate  of  the  cost-push  view.  Moreover,  within  the 
monetarist  camp  the  answer  may  differ  depend- 
ing  upon  whether  one  is  an  adaptive-expectations 
monetarist  or  a  rational-expectations  monetarist. 
Many  nonmonetarists  would  state  that  fiscal 
and  monetary  policy  variables  are  of  equal  im- 
portance.  Other  nonmonetarists,  while  agreeing 
that  monetary  policy  is  important,  would  never- 
theless  rank  it  behind  fiscal  policy.  Monetarists, 
on  the  other  hand,  would  concentrate  almost  ex- 
clusively  on  the  money  growth  variable  and  treat 
the  fiscal  variable  as  having  negligible  impor- 
tance.  True,  they  might  grudgingly  admit  that 
fiscal  policy  could  have  a  temporary  impact  on 
excess  demand.  But  they  would  emphasize  that 
any  fiscal  effects  would  be  short-lived  before 
vanishing  altogether. 
Although  monetarists  are  unanimous  in  deem- 
phasizing  the  impact  of  fiscal  policy,  they  tend 
to  differ  on  the  question  of  the  influence  of  mone- 
tary  growth  on  excess  demand.  Members  of  the 
adaptive-expectations  branch  believe  that  changes 
in  the  rate  of  monetary  growth  can  generate  tem- 
porary  changes  in  real  excess  demand  as  long  as 
expectations  are  unfulfilled.  On  the  other  hand, 
monetarists  of  the  rational-expectations  branch 
deny  that  monetary  growth  can  influence  real 
excess  demand  even  temporarily.  If  expectations 
are  formed  rationally,  the  economy  is  always- 
except  for  random  disturbances-  at  its  steady- 
state  equilibrium.  And  if  steady-state  equilibri- 
um  always  prevails,  it  follows  that  shifts  in  the 
rate  of  monetary  growth  influence  only  nominal 
variables  (e.g.,  the  rate  of  inflation)  but  not  real 
variables  like  excess  demand.  With  expectations 
adjusting  completely  and  instantaneously  to 
actual  outcomes,  inflationary 
sent,  and  rational  agents  are 
producing  excess  (i.e.,  greater 
output. 
surprises  are  ab- 
never  fooled  into 
than  equilibrium) 
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fluence  of  monetary  growth  on  real  excess  de- 
mand,  they  do  agree  that  cost-push  factors  should 
not  enter  the  demand-pressure  equation.  On  this 
point  they  are  in  direct  opposition  to  cost-push 
theorists,  who  hold  that  such  forces  play  a  major 
role  in  the  determination  of  excess  demand.  The 
latter  group  argues  that  not  only  does  the  cost- 
push  variable  directly  enter  the  demand-pressure 
equation  with  a  negative  sign,  but  that  it  also 
affects  excess  demand  indirectly  through  the  rate 
of  inflation.  With  monetary  growth  held  con- 
stant,  cost-push  pressure  on  prices  will  act  to 
reduce  real  purchasing  power,  thereby  causing 
real  spending  to  fall.  Thus,  assuming  constant 
monetary  growth,  the  operation  of  cost-push 
forces  causes  excess  demand  to  become  negative 
and  unemployment  to  rise. 
It  is  evident  from  the  preceding  discussion  that 
cost-push  theorists  also  believe  that  the  monetary 
growth  variable  plays  an  important  role  in  the 
determination  of  excess  demand.  In  fact,  this 
belief  constitutes  the  basis  for  their  advocacy  of 
accommodative  monetary  policy.  Passive  mone- 
tary  growth  is  necessary  to  offset  or  counteract 
the  contractionary  influence  of  cost-push  forces. 
On  the  other  hand,  an  activist  anti-inflationary 
monetary  policy  is  definitely  harmful.  Not  only 
is  it  incapable  of  controlling  cost  inflation,  but  it 
also  intensifies  the  unemployment  problem  gen- 
erated  by  cost-push  forces.  Cost  inflation  should 
be  restrained  by  direct  controls,  not  by  demand- 
management  policies. 
A  second  debate  concerns  the  process  by  which 
two  of  the  determinants  of  excess  demand- 
namely  the  monetary  and  fiscal  variables-them- 
selves  are  determined.  On  this  latter  question 
two  issues  are  especially  relevant.  First,  should 
the  policy  instruments  be  viewed  as  determined 
outside  or  inside  the  system?  Second,  are  the 
policy  instruments  independent  of  each  other? 
Regarding  the  former  issue,  there  are  two 
views.  One  asserts  that  the  policy  instruments 
should  be  treated  as  exogenous  variables  whose 
magnitudes  are  fixed  outside  the  model  of  the 
inflationary  process.  Advocates  of  this  view  be- 
lieve  that  the  main  line  of  causation  or  channel  of 
influence  runs  from  the  policy  instruments  to 
excess  demand  and  prices  rather  than  vice  versa. 
The  policy  instruments  can  be  treated  not  as 
dependent  or  accommodative  variables  respond- 
ing  to  prior  changes  in  demand  but  rather  as  the 
active  independent  variables  that  precede  and 
cause  shifts  in  demand.  The  alternative  view  is 
that  the  policy  instruments  should  be  treated  as 
endogenous  variables  determined  within  the  sys- 
tem  by  the  policymakers’  responses  to  changes  in 
economic  conditions.  Advocates  of  this  view  see 
causation  as  running  at  least  partially  from  ag- 
gregate  demand  and  inflation  to  the  policy  vari- 
ables.  They  argue  that  models  of  the  inflationary 
process  should  contain  additional  equations-so- 
called  policy  reaction  functions-describing  how 
the  authorities  change  the  settings  of  the  mone- 
tary  and  fiscal  instruments  in  response  to  fluctu- 
ations  in  aggregate  demand  and  the  rate  of  infla- 
tion.  An  example  of  such  a  policy  response  func- 
tion  would  be  where  the  authorities  pursue  a 
target  level  of  excess  demand,  seeking  monetary 
growth  and  budgetary  deficits  consistent  with  the 
attainment  of  the  target.  In  this  case  the  target 
level  of  excess  demand  would  enter  the  system  as 
a  datum  to  determine  the  values  of  the  monetary 
and  fiscal  instruments,  and  the  policy  regime 
would  be  described  by  the  equations  m  =  m(x) 
and  f  =  f(x). 
In  addition  to  the  exogeneity-endogeneity  issue, 
there  is  also  the  question  of  the  independence  of 
the  policy  instruments.  Are  the  monetary  and 
fiscal  variables  truly  independent  of  each  other  or 
do  they  move  together  ?  This  question  is  central 
to  the  debate  over  the  causes  of  inflation.  For  if 
the  instruments  are  in  fact  interrelated  so  that 
fiscal  deficits  are  accompanied  by  accelerating 
monetary  growth,  it  is  virtually  impossible  to 
identify  which  is  the  unique  source  of  inflation. 
Monetarists  and  nonmonetarists  can  cite  the 
same  evidence  to  support  their  respective  views. 
Many  analysts  believe  that  the  policy  instru- 
ments  are  not  independent  but  instead  are  inter- 
related  through  the  so-called  government  budget 
constraint.  This  constraint  states  the  mathe- 
matical  identity  between  the  government’s  bud- 
get  deficit  and  the  means  of  financing  it.  Specif- 
ically,  the  budget  constraint  states  that  the  deficit 
G  -  T-i.e.,  the  gap  between  government  ex- 
penditures  G  and  taxes  T-must  be  financed  by 
an  increase  in  government  debt  AD  and/or  by  an 
increase  in  the  monetary  base  AB  consisting  of 
currency  and  bank  reserves  created  by  the  central 
bank.  In  short,  a  fiscal  deficit  G  -  T  must  be 
financed  by  debt  issuance  AD  and  money  creation 
AB  as  expressed  by  the  budget  constraint  identity 
G  -  T  =  AD  +  AB. 
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financed  entirely  by  new  debt  issues  AD,  pro- 
vided  interest  rates  were  allowed  to  rise  to  suffi- 
ciently  high  levels.  In  practice,  however,  concern 
with  the  potentially  disrupting  effects  of  sharply 
rising  interest  rates  insures  that  this  drastic  route 
is  rarely  taken.  Instead,  fiscal  deficits  are  usually 
accommodated  at  least  partially  by  money  stock 
growth.  Thus,  the  variables  G  -  T  and  AB  tend 
to  move  together,  making  it  difficult  to  identify 
which,  if  either,  is  the  unique  cause  of  inflation. 
Summary  and  Conclusions  This  article  has  ex- 
amined  within  a  simple  aggregative  framework 
some  of  the  major  current  controversies  in  the 
theory  of  inflation.  On  the  basis  of  alternative 
positions  taken  in  these  debates,  at  least  four  dis- 
tinct  theories  can  be  identified.  They  are  sum- 
marized  as  follows. 
1.  ADAPTIVE-EXPECTATIONS  MONETAR- 
ISM.  This  theory  states  that  inflation  is  deter- 
mined  by  excess  aggregate  demand  and  price  ex- 
pectations ; that expectations  are generated  by past 
price  history  and hence by previous  excess demand; 
that  excess  demand  results  from  excessive  mone- 
tary  growth;  and therefore  that excessive  monetary 
growth,  past  and  present,  is  the  root  cause  of 
inflation.  Only  monetary  growth  matters;  cost- 
push factors  are  totally  ignored,  and fiscal  stimuli 
are largely  dismissed on the grounds  that they have 
no lasting  impact  on inflation.  Inflation-unemploy- 
ment  trade  offs  are  seen  as  existing  in  the  short- 
but not the long-run.  That  is, changes  in monetary 
growth,  by  causing  divergences  between  actual  and 
expected  rates  of  inflation,  can generate  large  and 
protracted  transitory  changes  in  excess  demand. 
and  associated  real  variables.  In  the  long  run, 
however,  expectations  will  be  fulfilled,  excess 
demand  will  be  zero,  and  monetary  growth  will 
influence  only  the  rate  of  inflation.  Monetary 
growth  cannot  affect  real  variables  in  steady-state 
equilibrium. 
2.  RATIONAL-EXPECTATIONS  MONETAR- 
ISM.  This  version  of  monetarism  predicts  that,  in 
the  absence  of  unpredictable  random  disturbances, 
steady-state  equilibrium  always  prevails.  Mone- 
tary  changes  produce  no  surprises,  no  disappointed 
expectations,  no  transitory  impacts  on  real  vari- 
ables.  Trade  offs  are  impossible  even  in  the short 
run.  This  theory  is  hard  to  square  with  such 
phenomena  as  stagflation,  the  apparent  intracta- 
bility  of  the  inflation  rate,  and the  short-run  non- 
neutrality  of  money. 
3.  PURE  COST-PUSH  THEORY.  More  popu- 
lar  in  Britain  than  in  the  U.S.,  this  theory  postu- 
lates  that  wage  and price  increases  are  determined 
solely  by  non-economic,  socio-political  cost-push 
forces  independent  of  general  economic  conditions. 
Inflation  is  explained  by  the  introduction  of  the 
cost-push variable  in the wage  and price  equations. 
All  other  determinants  are  dispensed  with.  Thus 
monetary  growth  is denied a direct  inflation-deter- 
mining  role,  its  only  function  being  to  passively 
accommodate  push-induced  cost  increases  in  order 
to maintain  output  and employment  at  high  levels. 
4.  ORTHODOX  NONMONETARISM.  Included 
in  this  category  are  a  variety  of  models  that  may 
differ  with  regard  to  such  features  as  long-run 
inflation-unemployment  trade-off  properties,  rela- 
tive  weight  given  to monetary  vs. fiscal  influences, 
and the like. Whatever  their  individual  differences, 
however,  nonmonetarist  models  as a class  have  the 
following  distinguishing  characteristic.  They  per- 
mit  all  three  exogenous  variables  -monetary 
growth,  fiscal  policy,  push  factors-to  influence 
excess demand and the rate  of  inflation.  Moreover, 
orthodox  nonmonetarism  shares  with  adaptive- 
expectations  monetarism  the  view  that  policy 
actions  will  affect  output  and  employment  first 
and  prices  only  later,  often  with  very  long  lags. 
But  whereas  monetarists  attribute  these  phenom- 
ena  solely  to  price  surprises  (disappointed  expec- 
tations)  and  lags  in  the  revision  of  expectations, 
nonmonetarists  believe  that  institutional  and  con- 
tractual  rigidities  are  also  to  blame. 
Of  these  four  theories,  two  appear  untenable 
when  judged  against  the  criteria  of  plausibility, 
realism,  and  relevance.  These  two,  of  course,  are 
rational-expectations  monetarism  and  the  pure 
cost-push  view.  The  former,  as  previously  stated, 
conflicts  with  the  observed  tendency  for  quan- 
tities  to  bear  the  burden  of  adjustment  to  mone- 
tary  changes,  while  prices  respond  very  slowly 
and  with  long  lags.  The  cost-push  theory,  on  the 
other  hand,  ,implies  a  degree  of  trade-union  mar- 
ket  power  and  full-employment-at-any-cost  policy 
that  has  never  existed  in  the  United  States. 
This  leaves  only  adaptive-expectations  mone- 
tarism  and  orthodox  nonmonetarism  as  serious 
contenders  for  the  distinction  of  constituting  the 
most  plausible  theory  of  inflation.  Both  are  capa- 
ble  of  accounting  for  the  phenomenon  of  stagfla- 
tion,  for  the  intractability  or  resistance  of  infla- 
tion  to  anti-inflationary  demand-management  pol- 
icies,  and  for  the  tendency  of  quantities  rather 
than  prices  to  adjust  to  shifts  in  demand.  Of  the 
two,  the  nonmonetarist  view  seems  to  be  the 
more  convincing  since  it  explains  sluggish  price 
adjustment  in  terms  of  contractual  and  institu- 
tional,  as  well  as  expectational,  rigidities.  In  any 
case,  if  and  when  a  new  consensus  view  of  infla- 
tion  finally  emerges,  it  will  probably  contain 
elements  of  both  the  monetarist  and  nonmone- 
tarist  explanations. 
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